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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Many people will be professionally or personally interested in the general subject of 
Friemann’s paper: argumentation in the context of relational difficulties. If it is not 
yourself who is involved in marital discussions, then at least a number of your 
acquaintances may be. Friemann’s approach to the subject could be characterised as 
multi-disciplinary, since he combines insights from different fields, such as 
communication, argumentation and psychology. These insights are not only derived from 
theoretical publications, but from a practical handbook on lessons in life as well.  
 From the author of the practical handbook, Gottman, we learn that in order to 
decide if there are sufficient grounds to remain married to your present partner there need 
to be at least five times as many good moments as bad moments. Friemann warns us that 
the application of the criterion is problematic. It is not immediately clear what is meant 
by ‘good’ and ‘bad’, neither what should be counted as a ‘moment’, nor how these 
moments should be scored. Nevertheless Friemann uses Gottman’s criterion as one of the 
starting points for his research that focuses on ‘heated argument episodes in intractable 
serial arguments. 
 Friemann’s paper could be divided into two parts in which, in my view, two 
different argumentative activities are discussed. In the first part he discusses the 
argumentative efforts that might lead to saving a relationship. In the second part he 
discusses the argumentative obligations when finishing a relationship. With regard to 
both parts I have some questions and comments regarding the feasibility and 
effectiveness of Friemann’s findings. 
 
2.  DECIDING ON STAYING MARRIED OR NOT  
 
In order to illustrate how ineffective communication among partners could become more 
effective, Friemann introduces us to Mark and Julie, a couple who are having and have 
had many relationship negotiation dialogues (RND). 
 The fact that the communication between Mark and Julie is not working out 
smoothly, but rather could be characterized as ‘intractable serial arguments with many 
instances of emotional flooding’ is, in my view, not at all surprising. It is as if the starting 
points for Mark and Julie in this argumentative discourse are completely different. 
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Friemann informs us that ‘Mark understands that when he is arguing with his partner 
Julie over a relationship issue, that they are having an RND’, whereas it seems to me that 
Julie is not aware of the fact that she is participating in RNDs at all, and Mark apparently 
is not going to tell her. Moreover, Mark is thinking about ending the relationship and he 
wonders ‘do I have sufficient grounds for remaining in this relationship’. However, 
‘Mark does not feel up to sharing this [question] with Julie’. This whole situation makes 
it unlikely that Mark really sympathises with what is, according to Weger, the goal of an 
RND, namely ‘to create a mutually acceptable definition of the relation’. It is, however, 
not clear what preconditions should be fulfilled to achieve the goal of an RND. Given the 
different starting points of Mark and Julie, it is also difficult to imagine what future 
argumentative obligations they have in respect of each other.  
 Nevertheless, now that Mark is facing the question whether or not he should end 
the relationship, he should, according to Friemann, not take chances with that. In his 
view, decisions such as these should be taken deliberately and should not be solely based 
on current feelings about the relationship. One of the ways to reach such a well-
considered decision is taking into account the results of a representative number of 
RNDs. Since the memory of how these RNDs have been developed may be unreliable, it 
would be advisable to keep a physical record of thoughts and feelings at the end of an 
RND. All these records together should provide a realistic picture of the relationship. In 
view of the reliability of the evaluation of an RND, it is not clear, however, why 
Friemann chooses to be vague as to the construction of these records. He says that a 
record ‘can be full of detail or an overall judgement of good or bad’. But if the 
considerations that have led to the judgment are made explicit, it will be easier to 
compare RNDs, and their results will be more informative as well as convincing.  
 The fact that the evaluation of the RNDs requires quite an effort brings us to yet 
another difficulty concerning the feasibility of the intended approach. Supposedly, not all 
participants who are having RNDs will pose the question whether there is sufficient 
ground for remaining in a relationship. Therefore, it is unclear when partners should start 
making records of the RNDs: should they anticipate the question about the continuation 
of the relationship and start making records right from the beginning or does anticipating 
the question in itself influence the course of RNDs? 
 So far Friemann has been discussing what is advisable in the process of deciding 
on a positive or a negative standpoint concerning the continuation of a relation (the 
heuristics phase). In the second part of his contribution, Friemann goes into how the 
result of the decision making process should be justified (the legitimization phase).  
 
3. JUSTIFYING THE END OF A MARRIAGE 
 
When the decision-making process has been completed and Mark has decided that he 
wants to end his relationship with Julie, it is desirable, according to Friemann, that Mark 
makes an attempt to justify his decision. In doing so, Mark assumes that Julie at least 
doubts his standpoint which, in pragma-dialectical terms, means that the dispute is non-
mixed (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). Friemann then poses the question which 
dialectical obligations Mark has. Part of these obligations involve, if I understand 
Friemann well, references to the records (or a diary) that were originally made of the 
RNDs in the decision-making process. These references may serve as important 
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arguments in the justification of the decision. The dialectical obligation Mark has, 
according to Friemann, to justify his standpoint could be reconstructed as follows:   
 
1.  I lack sufficient grounds for remaining in this relationship 
      
 
1.1 At the end of RNDs I have felt bad far more than I have felt good   
      
 
(1.1.1a RND 1-10 were ‘bad’  1.1.1.1b RND 11-12 were ‘good’) 
            
 
 
1.1.1a.1a  1.1.1a.1b   1.1.1b.1a  1.1.1b.1b 
Record RND 1 Record RND 2   etc. Record RND 11 Record RND 12 etc. 
 
The decision for a divorce is thus based on physical evidence of good and bad RNDs 
(1.1.1a.1a etc.). This evidence in its turn justifies that the relation does comply with the 
Gottman norm which in this case has been formulated as ‘I have felt bad far more than I 
have felt good’ (1.1). 
 Before Friemann puts forward what he considers to be the dialectical obligation of 
serial arguers such as Mark, he argues that these dialectical obligations cannot be 
characterized as dealing with Standard Objections as proposed by Johnson. But if Mark 
indeed has dialectical obligations, I fail to see why they could not consist of certain 
Standard Objections Mark should deal with. On an earlier OSSA conference (Plug, 
2000), I argued that critical questions that are inherent in a particular argumentation 
scheme, can be employed to anticipate objections that might be put forward. In this case, 
for example, the standpoint (1.) that there are no sufficient grounds for remaining the 
relationship is supported by the argument  (1.1.) that Mark’s feelings about many RNDs 
(more than 20 %) were bad. This symptomatic argumentation is reflected in the 
argumentation scheme: many bad RNDs (Z) are indicative for a bad relationship (Y). The 
critical questions that provide possible objections are the following  
  
1. Is (Z) really characteristic of (Y)? 
2. Is it possible for (Z) to be characteristic of something other than (Y)? 
3. Are there more characteristics (Z') necessary for X to attribute characteristic Y to 
 X? 
 
These ‘standard’ critical questions may thus generate Standard Objections that in the case 
of Mark and Julie will lead to objections towards the theory of Gottman that contains the 
(quantitative) norm that if there are not five times as many good moments as bad 
moments there are no sufficient grounds to stay in a relationship. The critical questions 
may also generate a possible objection with respect to the idea that the result of RNDs are 
indicative for the assessment of the good and the bad moments in a relationship. 
Although these critical questions may provide some relevant objections, it is by no means 
clear to me why they should be conceived as part of a dialectical obligation on Mark’s 
3 
H. JOSÉ PLUG 
part or of other serial arguers. The same holds true for what Friemann considers as the 
dialectical obligation of serial arguers, namely that they should make ‘some account of 
past feelings’. If these accounts are used in the justification of the decision, it is not 
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